Yemen Conflict

Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, in 2011, protests spread across Yemen against President Ali Abdullah Saleh who had been in power for over 30 years. These peaceful protests deteriorated into armed clashes between government forces and opposition groups, including the Houthis, after the government used excessive force against demonstrators.

Additional resources:

For a detailed breakdown of how the peaceful protests deteriorated into armed clashes, see this analysis by Human Rights Watch.

Mounting pressure eventually led to Saleh handing over power to his Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi in exchange for immunity in a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia, in February 2012. This was followed by the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) – a process of transitional negotiations, involving Hadi’s new government, the Houthis and several other armed groups, towards a new constitutional system that was hoped would resolve tensions between these factions.

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For analysis of the structure and objectives of the National Dialogue Conference, see here.

Negotiations began to break down in 2014 as the NDC participants failed to agree on key outcomes of the Conference, allowing the Houthis to increase their influence and control over territory, eventually taking control of the capital. The Houthis continued to consolidate power after gaining control of Sana’a and in early 2015, they began to move south towards Aden on the Arabian Sea, where President Hadi had escaped having been forced to resign.

Additional resources:

For an overview and legal analysis of the situation in Yemen as the Houthis increased their control, see this Lawfare blog post.

As the Houthis advanced towards Aden, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and requested international support, triggering the formation and involvement of the international coalition of states led by Saudi Arabia. It is of note that despite the involvement of foreign state actors, under international humanitarian law, this is classified as a non-international armed conflict as the Coalition acted with the consent of the internationally-recognised government of Yemen.

Additional resources:

For a detailed overview of the classification and parties to the conflict, see this entry on RULAC.

The UN was relatively slow to respond to the escalating crisis and when it did intervene in April 2015, although well-intended, its actions were considered to be misguided and directly impacted the humanitarian situation. UN Resolution 2216, passed on 14 April 2015, formally recognised Hadi as the ‘legitimate’ president of Yemen, and called for Houthis to fully disarm and surrender territory they had seized including Sana’a.

This resolution isolated the Yemeni population as it was perceived to legitimise the Coalition’s military intervention and failed to take concrete measures to protect civilians, in turn allowing the Houthis to strengthen their control. It also imposed an arms embargo against the Houthis, which was used as justification by the Coalition for the blockade of Yemeni ports.

Additional resources:

For more analysis of the weaknesses of UN Resolution 2216, see analysis by the International Crisis Group, Sana’a Center, and the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The Coalition has enforced a naval and air blockade, with varying levels of restrictions on imports, since its involvement in the conflict in March 2015, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Notably, following attacks in Saudi territory in November 2017, the Coalition closed all sea, land and air access preventing the entry of all goods, including humanitarian aid, into Yemen. Since this complete blockade ended in April 2018, the Coalition has continued to impose restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid as well as the import of food, medicine and other essential goods into Houthi-controlled territory. 

Additional resources:

For detailed analysis on the blockade and how this can be considered as torture, see this report by OMCT.

The ROYG and Houthis first agreed to UN-mediated peace talks in late 2018 resulting in the Stockholm Agreement, which was intended to avert escalation in the besieged city of Hodaidah on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. While this initially averted hostilities in Hodaidah, the other terms of the deal, which included prisoner exchange and de-escalation efforts, have never been implemented.

Additional resources:

For an overview of the outbreak of the conflict and the significance and limitations of the Stockholm agreement, see this article in the American Society of International Law journal.

See this joint NGO statement from December 2021, which highlights the limited implementation of the agreement.

Armed conflict damaged Yemen’s central government and divided the country into numerous local power centres. In particular, alongside Saudi-Houthi confrontations, long-simmering tensions between Hadi-loyalist forces and a separatist UAE-backed group operating in southern Yemen – the Southern Transitional Council (STC) – erupted in open combat in the summer of 2019 with the STC capturing key territory in the south, including government headquarters in the city of Aden.

This was followed by sporadic skirmishes, however at the end of 2020, the parties ultimately put a power-sharing arrangement brokered by Saudi Arabia (the Riyadh Agreement) into effect and established a shaky coalition government with representation from northern and southern factions to unite the two parties against the Houthis. 

Additional resources:

For analysis of the role of the STC, see this article by the International Crisis Group.

For more detail on the coalition government, see this article from Al Jazeera, and analysis from the Middle East Institute.

The Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen (GEE) was established in 2017 at the request of the Human Rights Council in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Yemen with a mandate to examine all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and other violations of international law committed by all parties to the conflict since September 2014.

The GEE presented four reports to the Human Rights Council, which reported evidence of possible war crimes committed by all sides, and made several recommendations to address accountability for serious crimes in Yemen, including recommending the creation of an international criminal investigation body and calling on the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC. Its reports also emphasised the role of arms transfers in perpetuating the conflict and potentially contributing to violations of international law, and repeatedly called for third states to stop providing arms and military support to parties to the conflict in Yemen. 

In October 2021, the Human Rights Council rejected a resolution to renew the mandate of the GEE in an unexpected development that reportedly resulted from concerted behind-the-scenes lobbying by Saudi Arabia. This is a critical loss to efforts to hold parties to the conflict, as well as arms-contributing states, accountable for international law violations.

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Find out more about their mandate and read their most recent report here.

Commencing on 2 April 2022 a UN-mediated truce that mandated a cessation of hostilities throughout Yemen was agreed, marking the first pause in hostilities since 2016. In particular, the parties agreed to cease all offensive military operations in Yemen and across its borders, to allow ships to enter Hodeidah port, and to reopen the national airport to commercial flights. There was also agreement to work towards reopening road access to areas of Yemen, including Taiz.

Initially established for a two-month period, the truce was extended for a further four months. While this did have an impact on the intensity of fighting and the civilian cost of the war, the truce was violated on several occasions and the humanitarian situation in certain areas remained dire.

Notably, the Houthis refused to open routes into Taiz, a major city which connects the North and South of the country where humanitarian aid is desperately needed. The Houthis have blocked the main roads in and around the city since 2015, impeding the entry and flow of humanitarian aid and exacerbating the suffering of Taiz’s besieged residents.

The truce came to an end on 2 October, 2022, when the warring parties failed to reach agreement on a third extension by this deadline. This led to international concern that the lull in fighting witnessed in recent months will come to an end and all parties have been urged to refrain from renewed attacks. However, the overall security situation in Yemen has remained relatively stable since the ending of the truce, with no major escalation. That said, military activity around the front lines has been recorded.

Additional resources:

For analysis of the extent to which the truce was respected, see the ACLED truce monitor.

For a brief overview of the decision not to renew the truce, and an initial assessment of its possible impact see this explainer by Amnesty International. 

For further information on the humanitarian situation in Taiz, see this press release issued by a coalition of NGOs calling for the urgent reopening of Taiz roads.

On 9 April 2023, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Yemen visited Sana’a for talks with the Houthi-led Supreme Political Council, which was also attended by Omani officials. This was part of an effort to stabilise the truce and ceasefire, support the prisoner exchange process and explore venues of dialogue between Yemeni actors to reach a sustainable, comprehensive political solution in Yemen. In April 2023, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) facilitated the release of 973 detainees over four days as part of a prisoner swap agreed upon in Switzerland in March.

The proposal to the Houthis was for a two-year process involving three stages of talks between the Houthis and the Presidential Leadership Council (representing the internationally recognised government); confidence-building measures, including the payment of salaries to civil servants to include security and military personnel in Houthi-held areas; the reopening of roads; and the expansion of flights from Sana’a airport during the first six months followed by three months of preparations ahead of final status talks over a transition period. No conclusions to these negotiations were reached.

Since 7 October 2023, all previous talks were halted and there have been no real efforts to revive them. Beyond this, the implications of this recent escalation on the historical conflict and political situation in Yemen remain unclear as of March 2024.

(See below for further details)

Additional resources:

For more detail on the negotiation process, see this article from the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and this article from the Middle East Eye.

On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise offensive in southern Israel, and in response, Israel launched a massive air and ground offensive, accompanied by a total siege of Gaza. The Houthis resumed their “air and missile” warfare, though targeted towards Israel. In mid-October, the US announced that it had downed several Houthi cruise missiles and UAVs launched towards Israel. On 31 October 2023, the Houthis announced that it entered the war against Israel in support of the Palestinians in Gaza, and launched a large number of rockets, missiles, and UAVs towards Israel. None of these projectiles reached Israel. On 19 November 2023, the Houthis hijacked a commercial ship in the Red Sea, and since then started targeting shipping vessels affiliated with Israel passing through the Sea. Per reports from mid-March 2024, 34 of these attacks have resulted in damage to the vessels. These attacks prompted the US and UK to carry out coordinated air strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen on 11 and 22 January. Regardless, the Houthis have continued to carry out attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, including those not affiliated with Israel.

After fleeing Yemen for Saudi Arabia in 2015, Hadi continued in his office from Riyadh as leader of the internationally recognized government of Yemen (ROYG). In April 2022, Hadi announced the formation of a new presidential council to take over his responsibilities. The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) was formed as the executive body of Yemen’s internationally recognised government to seek a “comprehensive political solution”. It is led by Hadi’s advisor, Rashad al-Alimi, who has authority over the army. There are seven other members who make up the council. 

The General People’s Congress (GPC) is a political party established in 1982 by President Ali Abudallah Saleh. They acted as the governing party since 2002, but high-ranking and influential members defected from the party after the government’s crackdown on the 2011 protests. It further fragmented after the killing of President Saleh in 2017 and its internal leadership is irrevocably split.

The Islah Party was formed in 1990 and has been part of the official government of Yemen. It gained prominence during the 2012-2014 political transition. They have engaged in clashes with the Houthis since the latter took over Sana’a in 2014. They were the first party to support Saudi Arabia’s March 2015 announcement of the launch of Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis and have since maintained a strong relationship with the latter.

The Houthis initially resembled a theological movement advocating for peace. The title ‘Houthis’ is given to the followers of the movement’s late leader Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. The movement follows a sect of Shia Islam and is mainly based in Yemen’s northern areas, close to the Yemeni-Saudi border. The Houthi movement was not a supporter of Saleh’s policies, particularly that he tolerated the establishment of Sunni shrines in northern Yemen. As a result, the Houthis started adopting some belligerent stances, galvanising Saleh to launch six wars against their areas since 2004. The Houthis have a close relationship with Iran.

The Houthis have complete control of Hodeida’s harbour, city, and northern entrance. A coalition of forces (dubbed the “Joint Resistance Forces”) has been stationed there along the Red Sea coast to the south since 2018, when the “Joint Forces” attempted to retake Hodaidah from the Houthis (before the Stockholm Agreement halted the fighting). This comprises an alliance between the Tihamah Resistance, Southern Giants Brigades, and the Tareq Saleh-led Guardians of the Republic. They work independently from President Hadi and are not formally a part of the ROYG.

Catalysed by Ali Abdullah Saleh’s economic failures and the corruption that weighed down the state and the marginalised population of southern Yemen, The Southern Movement (otherwise known as Hirak) – a political movement that originated in the south- was established in 2007. With the deterioriating political and economic situation, Hirak appealed for the forced resignation of the Saleh regime’s southern security forces, the redistribution of resources and a readjustment to the balance of power between the north and the south as the former enjoyed greater political and economic entitlements.

Established in May 2017, this group arose as a sub-state to challenge the authority of Mansour Hadi’s government through advancing the interests of the Southerners by promoting stability in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al-Mandab. The goal of the STC is to advocate for independence of the Southern region based on the country’s pre-1990 territorial borders.